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Case Note
RESOLVING THE FREE EXERCISE AND
ESTABLISHMENT CONFLICT IN CALDOR V.
THORNTON: ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION
DESIGNED TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
OR PREVENT RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
In Caldor v. Thornton, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that a statute permit-
ting employees to refuse to work on their sabbath violated the first amendment as an
impermissible establishment of religion. This Case Note argues that the Connecticut
Supreme Court incorrectly applied the current establishment clause test and should
have considered competing free exercise rights. The authors conclude that the statute
may be upheld either as a permissible accommodation of religious freedom or as
antidiscrimination legislation.
INTRODUCTION
An inherent conflict' exists between the two religion clauses of
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.' The estab-
lishment clause protects against the government's promoting and
regulating religion;3 the free exercise clause prohibits a state's in-
fringing upon religious observance.' At some point, protection of
1. See infra text accompanying note 6.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
3. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 818-19 (1978). See
generally Kushner, Toward the Central Meaning of Religious Liberty: Non-Sunday Sab-
batarians and the Sunday Closing Cases Revisited, 35 Sw. L.J. 557, 574 (1982). The establish-
ment clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
4. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § IA, at 1029
(1983); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 818. The free exercise clause applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
There are at least three major interpretations of the Framers' intent behind the first
amendment religion clauses. Roger Williams advocated a system whereby state aid to reli-
gion without control would provide the ideal balance. Thomas Jefferson advocated a com-
plete separation of government and religion. James Madison opposed governmental
interference with religion or placement of direct or indirect burdens on individuals because of
their religion or beliefs. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816-19.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that neutrality towards religion is one of
government's major responsibilities. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1970); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21
(1971). How to measure government neutrality has been discussed by courts and commenta-
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the free exercise of religion becomes state advancement of religion.5
Similarly, a state's attempt to remain neutral in its policies and to
protect against governmental advancement of religion eventually
encroaches upon an individual's free exercise of religion. 6 The
United States Supreme Court has developed separate standards for
testing the constitutionality of governmental actions under each
religion clause.7 However, the Court has provided little guidance
for determining whether legislation designed to protect the free ex-
ercise of religion or to prevent discrimination against religion may
violate the establishment clause.8
The Court will have the opportunity to provide this guidance in
Caldor v. Estate of Thornton.9 In Caldor, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut held that a Connecticut statute which permits an em-
ployee to designate his sabbath as his day off1" violated the estab-
lishment clause of the United States Constitution. 1 The court
struck down the statute under its interpretation of the three-part
establishment clause test developed by the United States Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 2 However, the Connecticut court
failed to consider whether to modify the establishment clause in-
quiry when competing free exercise rights are present. 13
In deciding Caldor, the Court can provide a means to determine
the constitutionality of legislation designed to protect religious free-
dom or to prevent religious discrimination. The Court has the op-
portunity to clarify the extent to which a state may accommodate
an individual's freedom to worship without violating the establish-
ment clause and the extent to which a state may affirmatively mini-
tors. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4, at 820-21; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab-
lishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 513 (1968).
5. See infra notes 50-113 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 31 (three-part establishment clause test), 127 (free exercise clause
balancing test) and accompanying text.
8. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1380 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
generally Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. Pirt. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1980).
9. Caldor v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984).
10. See infra note 26.
11. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794.
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Caldor, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (free exercise rights are not
mentioned).
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mize religious discrimination.14 This Case Note critiques the
Connecticut court's analysis of the first amendment issues in Cal-
dor 5 and suggests two approaches for resolving the conflict be-
tween the free exercise and establishment clauses presented by the
Connecticut statute. 1
6
I. FACTS OF CALDOR V THORNTON
Caldor, Inc., which operates a chain of retail stores in New Eng-
land, hired Donald Thornton as a department manager in 1975.1 7
In 1977, Caldor opened its Connecticut stores for Sunday busi-
ness18 and required all department managers, including Thornton,
to work every fourth Sunday. 9 In late 1979, Thornton informed
Caldor that he would no longer work on Sundays as that day was
his sabbath.20
In an attempt to remedy the situation, Caldor executives offered
Thornton two alternatives. First, Thornton could remain a supervi-
sor by transferring to a Massachusetts store which did not have
Sunday hours. Alternatively, he could accept a demotion and re-
main in the Connecticut store where the union contract would per-
mit him to not work on Sundays.2" After Thornton rejected these
alternatives,22 Caldor informed him that he would be demoted.23
Thornton subsequently resigned.24
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes section 53-303e(c),25
Thornton appealed Caldor's decision to the Connecticut State
Board of Mediation and Arbitration, alleging he was discharged
within the meaning of the statute.2 6 The Board found for Thornton
14. Professor Tribe refers to this as permissible, versus mandated or forbidden, accom-
modation. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-4, -5, at 819-25.
15. See infra notes 50-113 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
17. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 337-38, 464 A.2d at 788.
18. Id. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788. Caldor opened its stores on Sundays following the
repeal of Connecticut's Blue Laws. Cf. Bologna, A Critical History of Connecticut Sunday
Closing Legislation Since 1955, 12 CONN. L. REV. 539, 551-56 (1980) (discussing Connecti-
cut's repeal of its Blue Laws).
19. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The move to Massachusetts would have involved a difficult commute or reloca-
tion while demotion entailed a substantial salary reduction. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(c) (1976).




* and issued him an award.2 7 The Connecticut trial court affirmed,
also holding that section 53-303e was constitutional under the es-
tablishment clause.28
II. ANALYSIS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Connecticut Supreme Court's Holding
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court, hold-
ing that section 53-303e violated the establishment clause.29 The
court found that the statute failed all three parts of the establish-
ment clause test 30 as set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.31 Specifically,
the court reasoned that the statute lacked a clearly secular pur-
pose,32 it had the primary effect of advancing religion,33 and it cre-
ated excessive governmental entanglement with religion.3"
The Connecticut court rigidly applied the Lemon test's purpose
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial occupa-
tion or in the work of any industrial process to work more than six days in any
calendar week. An employee's refusal to work more than six days in any calendar
week shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(b) No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's
refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection
(a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation
and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of
said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee
whole, including but not limited to reinstatement to his former or a comparable
position.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether the
applicant observes any Sabbath.
CO . GEN. STAT. § 53-303e (1976).
27. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788. The Board of Mediation and Arbitra-
tion found that Caldor had discharged Thornton within the meaning of the statute, but re-
fused to determine the constitutionality of § 53-303e because it lacked the power to do so. Id.
28. Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 789.
29. Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794.
30. Id. at 349-51, 464 A.2d at 793-94.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test states that, to be valid, a statute must first
"have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. . . [and] finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). Though Lemon was the first case to apply this test, different parts
of it were articulated in Walz and in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). A
statute is invalid under the establishment clause if it fails any one of the three requirements.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
32. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 346-49, 464 A.2d at 792-93. See infra notes 35-39 and accom-
panying text.
33. Id. at 349-50, 464 A.2d at 793-94. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 350-51, 464 A.2d at 794. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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requirement. The court found that section 53-303e(b), 35 which pro-
hibited employers from requiring their employees to work on their
sabbaths, failed because its purpose was not secular.36 The court
reasoned that because the term "Sabbath" was used, the statute had
the "unmistakable purpose"37 of allowing religious employees the
freedom to observe their sabbaths.38 Thus, the statute lacked a sec-
ular purpose such as providing a common day of rest for all em-
ployees as in McGowan v. Maryland,39 a prior United States
Supreme Court case holding Sunday closing laws constitutional.'
The court held, under the second part of the Lemon test, that
the statute's primary effect was the impermissible advancement of
religion.41 The court recognized that the statute neither provided
direct financial aid to religious institutions nor favored one religion
over another.42 Its analysis focused on whether the enactment
benefitted all employees.43 According to the court, since the statute
conferred benefits on an "explicitly religious basis,"'  granting only
sabbath observers the right to designate a day off, it failed the pri-
mary effect requirement.45
Finally, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered section 53-
303e under the third part of the Lemon test and found that it fos-
tered excessive governmental entanglement.46 The court concluded
that the statute's enforcement mechanism47 would require the
Board of Mediation and Arbitration, a governmental agency, to an-
alyze religious practices and activities in determining the validity of
sabbath observance.48 This inquiry into and monitoring of religious
practices would create a "comprehensive, discriminating and con-
35. The court's holding only invalidated subsection (b) of § 53-303e. Caldor, 191 Conn.
at 351, 464 A.2d at 794 n.lI.
36. Id. at 349, 464 A.2d at 793.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 347-49, 464 A.2d at 792-93. The court focused exclusively on the religious
component of the word "Sabbath" and did not analyze whether this legislation had a plausi-
ble secular purpose. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
39. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
40. Id.
41. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 349-50, 464 A.2d at 793-94.
42. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
43. Id. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
44. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794. The court found that only employees
who designate a particular day for observance of a sabbath receive the benefits of § 53-303e(b)
by not having to work on that day. Id. See infra note 206.
45. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
46. Id.
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(c) (1976).
48. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350-51, 464 A.2d at 794.
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.tinuing state surveillance" of religion which Lemon had described
as excessive entanglement between church and state.4 9
B. The Lemon Test: Recent Trends and Modifications
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
the establishment clause was to protect against "sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity."5 This reflected the belief that church and state should be
separate and that government must remain neutral towards reli-
gion." The Court eventually developed the three-part test articu-
lated in Lemon v. Kurtzman to give these intentions effect.5 2 Since
Lemon, the Court has modified the secular purpose,53 primary ef-
fect, 54 and entanglement 5 prongs of the test.56 At times it has
found the test inapplicable.57
Although this Case Note argues that Lemon is an inappropriate
test for determining whether statutes such as section 53-303e violate
the establishment clause,58 it will explore the application of Lemon
to Caldor. The Case Note concludes that, in light of Lemon and
subsequent decisions, the Connecticut court should have upheld the
49. Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
But see infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
50. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). See supra note 4.
51. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948).
52. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra note 31.
53. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
56. See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) (Court stated its "unwill-
ingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area"); Mueller v. Allen,
103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (Court modified purpose test to require only a plausible secular
purpose); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1983) (grant of historically governmental
function to church created excessive administrative entanglement).
57. See, eg., Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (Court applied a "historical"
analysis test rather than the three-part test); Larson v..Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Court
applied a strict scrutiny test). But see Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that Larson also involved traditional Lemon analysis of entanglement).
The Court has used history in different ways to determine the scope of establishment.
One method looks at the Framers' intent at the time of the writing of the Constitution. The
Court has also applied a flexible standard, focusing on what the Framers would likely intend
in today's world. In Marsh, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court focused on what the Framers
considered permissible in their own time. The Court reasoned that since the Framers allowed
legislative prayer when they prohibited the establishment of religion, those prayers do not
violate the establishment clause today. In contrast, the Court in Lynch used history to show
that a creche, once religious, had now taken on a secular purpose, much like Sunday holi-
days. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362-63.
58. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
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statute.59
1. The Purpose Requirement
The purpose requirement seeks to discern the legislative intent
behind a particular law.60 Under Lemon, if the legislation lacks a
clearly secular purpose, it violates the establishment clause.61 The
Court in Mueller v. Allen62 interpreted the purpose requirement to
mean that legislation having a plausible secular purpose63 should
not be invalidated by the Court's ascribing possible unconstitutional
motives to the state.' 4 Thus, any legitimate secular purpose should
satisfy this part of the Lemon test.
The proper inquiry in Caldor, therefore, should be whether sec-
tion 53-303e has a plausible secular purpose. 66 One plausible legis-
lative purpose was to eliminate religious discrimination in the
workplace.67 Minimizing the effects of discrimination by providing
equal employment opportunities is another secular goal.68
59. See infra notes 60-113 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 ("Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the...
statutes affords no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion.").
61. Id. See supra note 31.
62. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3066.
65. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-8, at 835 (the purpose requirement should have a
low threshold standard). The Court has also limited invalidation of statutes under the pur-
pose requirement by sustaining laws that merely coexist with existing religious practices. See,
e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws found to have a secu-
lar purpose even though they coincided with an existing religious sabbath); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (city's exhibit of creche and other symbols held to have a secular
purpose despite religious overtones).
66. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The Connecticut court neither raised
nor answered this question. Caldor, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785.
67. This was found to be the purpose in similar state legislation requiring reasonable
accommodation of religious practices. Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Kern
Bakery, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983). See
also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(in discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982),
Marshall stated that "[t]he purpose and primary effect of requiring such exemptions is the
wholly secular one of securing equal economic opportunity to members of minority
religions.").
68. Kern Bakery, 644 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115
(1983); Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Courts have upheld legislation designed to eliminate religious discrimination. In Nottel-
son v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1046 (1981), a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged for failing to pay union dues. The
court found that the employer had violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), by not accommodating its employee's religious beliefs. More-




In determining whether the primary effect of legislation ad-
vances religion, the Court generally focuses on whether the legisla-
tion "benefits" religion.6 9 Legislation that benefits religion
indirectly, remotely, or incidentally does not violate the establish-
ment clause.7°
In Mueller v. Allen,7 ' the Court held that certain tax legislation
did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.72 This legisla-
tion, which provided tax deductions for educational expenses, pri-
marily benefited only those parents who sent their children to
sectarian schools.7 3 The Court held that since there was no actual
public expenditure,74 and the deduction depended solely upon indi-
vidual choice, the statute's benefits were too attenuated to constitute
direct aid to religion.75
In Walz v. Tax Commission,76 a New York statute granted in-
come and property tax exemptions to religious organizations. How-
ever, all nonprofit organizations received this tax benefit. Religious
the court, the purpose of the statute was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities."
Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 454, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). The
court found that this was a valid secular purpose and upheld the statute. Id. at 454.
The Ninth Circuit faced the identical fact pattern in Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981). The court in that case found two
secular purposes: prohibition of religious discrimination and provision of equal employment
opportunities. In a companion case, Anderson v. General Dynamics Corvair Aerospace Di-
vision, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982), the court upheld the
statute for the reasons set forth in Tooley.
Alternatively, the accommodation of religious practices may itself be a secular purpose.
This is one possible reading of Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), which upheld legisla-
tion permitting children to be released from school for religious instruction. Although the
Court did not apply the three-part establishment clause test, it can be assumed from this case
that accommodation of religious freedom does not violate the purpose requirement, and may
even satisfy it.
The Court has arguably qualified the secular purpose requirement by recognizing the im-
possibility of complete separation of church and state. See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.
Ct. 1355, 1358-59 (1984) (to require total separation between church and state would be to
ignore the practical relationship existing between religion and government); Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 614 (the "wall" between church and state changes with the circumstances of each
situation).
69. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
70. See id. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 840 ("IT]he remote-indirect-and-inci-
dental standard plainly compels a more searching inquiry .
71. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
72. Id. at 3067-69.
73. Id. at 3064-65.
74. Id. at 3069.
75. Id. at 3069-70.
76. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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organizations were just some of many institutions so classified.7 7
Since churches were part of a larger category receiving tax exemp-
tions, the statute only incidentally benefited religion, and therefore
did not violate the establishment clause.7" In Mueller and Walz,
therefore, the Court held that the statutes did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion even though religious organizations
were benefited.
The statute involved in Caldor does not grant financial benefits
to individual sabbath observers, 79 or to religious institutions.8 0 The
issue, then, is whether permitting religious observers to designate
their sabbath as their day off from work provides the kind of benefit
which the establishment clause prohibits.
One possible analysis is that benefits accruing to individuals are
not the concern of the establishment clause.8 ' For example, the
Court in Mueller argued that even financial assistance used primar-
ily by Catholic individuals only indirectly benefited religion. 2 The
statute in Caldor is even less threatening to the establishment clause
since it treats all religions alike, and does not involve financial
benefits.
Furthermore, legislation which accommodates religion is not
necessarily forbidden by the establishment clause.8 3 In Zorach v.
Clauson, 4 only those children attending sectarian programs were
released from school. The Court in Zorach noted that this type of
legislation was different from financial aid statutes,8 5 and although
accommodation of school children resulted in a privilege, the stat-
77. Id. at 672-73.
78. Id. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) (availability of public
forum at university to religious sects did not advance religion because it was open to many
groups, resulting in a broad distribution of benefits).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(c) (1976). Section 53-303e provides that employees
can only work six days a week and that sabbath observers do not have to work on their
sabbath. There is no financial aid provision involved. See id.
80. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
81. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (balance in favor of free exercise when aid is
to individuals rather than religious institution); Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v.
Kern Bakery, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (state legislation requiring
"reasonable accommodation" of religion despite potential benefit to some individuals), cert
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983).
82. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (Court indicated that not
accommodating religious practitioners would be "preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe.").
84. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
85. Id. at 314. See also L. TRIBa, supra note 3, § 14-4, at 820-21 (benefit to religion has
generally been decided by the amount of economic aid given; however, the Court now stresses
"neutrality" rather than financial aid).
[Vol. 35:132
CALDOR V THORNTON
ute did not violate the establishment clause.8 6 Maintenance of reli-
gious diversity and promotion of accommodation will inevitably
lead to the creation of privileges.8 7
3. Excessive Entanglement
The purpose of the entanglement requirement is to prevent a
union between church and state that would "destroy government
and degrade religion."' 8  Consequently, government and religion
must remain separate. The Court in Lemon concluded that the es-
tablishment clause prohibited both political and administrative
entanglement.8 9
Political entanglement is concerned with the "hazards of reli-
gion's intruding into the political arena or of political power intrud-
ing into the legitimate and free exercise of religious belief."90 The
principal fear is "political division along religious lines" resulting
from religious individuals and institutions promoting their positions
to receive financial appropriations. 91 The Court in Lemon struck
down a statute because it financially benefited only a few religious
groups, thereby increasing the potential for political divisiveness.92
Larson v. Valente93 involved a statute governing charitable con-
tributions. The law granted exemptions from reporting and regis-
tration requirements only to those religious organizations which
received over half of their total contributions from members. 94 The
Court held that the statute violated the establishment clause be-
cause it lacked denominational neutrality. The selective imposition
of burdens politicized religion and, therefore, excessively entangled
religion and government.95
Administrative entanglement, on the other hand, is concerned
86. 343 U.S. at 315.
87. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 86-87 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
88. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
89. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 615-24 (1971). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1367
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Lemon test should be limited to administrative
entanglement cases).
90. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
91. Id. at 622; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-2, at S -0.
92. Id. at 623-25. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 758 (1973) (Court struck down financial aid programs for nonpublic elemen-
tary and secondary schools because of the political entanglement implications).
93. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
94. Id. at 231-32.
95. Id. at 253-55.
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with church involvement in governmental functions96 or govern-
ment monitoring or surveillance of religion.97 Lemon, for instance,
involved legislation permitting government inspection of church
school records to guarantee that monetary aid went solely to the
teaching of secular subjects.98 The Court held that this legislation
created an unconstitutional entanglement between church and
state.9 9 In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,"° the Court held that granting
religious institutions the equivalent of an administrative veto over
liquor licenses was unconstitutional since it involved churches in a
governmental function.?10
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Caldor was concerned with
administrative entanglement since section 53-303e(c) granted the
Board of Mediation and Arbitration the jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints of wrongful employee discharge due to sabbath obser-
vance.1"2 The court held that resolution of these disputes would
require an unconstitutional inquiry into religious practices. 103 This
analysis is unpersuasive.
Section 53-303e does not grant religious institutions the power
to perform any governmental functions as did the statute in Larkin
v. Grendel's Den,"° nor does it authorize the state to inspect church
records or activities as in Lemon v. Kurtzman.10 5  Rather, the
Board's authority to resolve disputes involving sabbath observance
and discharge merely permitted it to consider the sincerity of the
complainant's religious beliefs.10 6 Courts and review boards con-
duct similar inquiries in selective service cases10 7 and free exercise
clause exemption cases. 10 8 This is not the monitoring of any partic-
ular religion, but the determination of an individual's credibility
96. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1983).
97. See Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
675 (1970) ("official and continuing surveillance").
98. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616.
99. Id. at 625.
100. 459 U.S. 116 (1983).
101. Id. at 126-27.
102. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(c) (1976).
103. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350-51, 464 A.2d at 794.
104. 459 U.S. 116 (1983). The statute in question in Larkin gave churches the power to
deny liquor licenses, which the Court viewed as a state administrative function. Id. at 117.
105. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
106. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-51 (1971) (conscientious objec-
tor must have objection to war grounded in sectarian belief and training).
108. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits granted to
party who resigned for religious beliefs).
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and good faith. 19 Courts have long engaged in this type of inquiry
without violating the establishment clause. 1 ' Although the govern-
ment should not evaluate religious practices or investigate the oper-
ation of a religious institution,"' it has been recognized that
enforcement of the religion clauses necessarily entails some inquiry
into religion." 2 The statute in Caldor did not involve excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion." 3
III. THE OVERLAP OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The two religion clauses overlap and possibly conflict in two sit-
uations. The first arises when general legislation imposes a burden
on the free exercise of one's religion.' The major questions
presented are whether the free exercise clause mandates an exemp-
tion, 115 whether an exemption would violate the establishment
clause," 6 and which clause should predominate in the case of a con-
flict. 11  In the second, legislation designed to protect religious free-
109. See, eg., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (accept religious beliefs if
made in good faith and arguably religious); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 457 ("the question is whether
the objector's beliefs are 'truly' held," not whether the beliefs are true) (citing United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643
F.2d 445, 455 (7th Cir.) ("The government is required only to determine whether a belief is
'religious' within the meaning of the statute ... and whether it is sincerely held, a question
of credibility."), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981).
110. The inquiry required in Caldor is no greater than what governmental agencies or
courts have engaged in previously. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(inquiry necessary to see if a religious organization qualifies for nonprofit tax status); Sherbert
v. Veruer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (judicial inquiry necessary to establish that withholding unem-
ployment benefits burdened religious freedom); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(Court held that Amish had presented enough evidence to make a free exercise claim).
111. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (tax exemption held to
require less involvement in religion than inquiry needed for tax valuation, therefore exemp-
tion entailed less entanglement); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (amount of evaluation
necessary to guarantee that church school room instruction remained secular in nature would
be excessive surveillance of religious institution's operation).
112. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part
I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1423-31 (1967).
113. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
115. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Court ordered that the Amish be
exempted from Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance requirement because of the burden
placed on their free exercise of religion). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4, at 821
(discussion of "zone of required accommodation").
116. See, eg., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21 (Court acknowledged that exceptions from gen-
eral laws "may run afoul of the Establishment Clause"); Sherbert v. Veruer, 374 U.S. 398,
409 (1963) (exemption from unemployment benefit requirements was not" 'establishment' of
the Seventh-Day Adventist religion"). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-4, -5, at
819-25 (discussion of forbidden, permissible and mandatory accommodation).
117. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. Through the rest of this text, cases re-
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dom or to prevent religious discrimination presents a potential
conflict between the two clauses. 118 The concern with this type of
conflict is whether legislative accommodation of religious beliefs is
permissible under the establishment clause. 119 The statute in Cal-
dor involves this second type of conflict, but the Connecticut court
discussed neither situation. 120
A. Protecting the Free Exercise of Religion: The Exemption
Cases
The courts have created or permitted exemptions for citizens
whose free exercise rights have been burdened by state laws of gen-
eral application.'12  In Sherbert v. Verner,122 a Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist was fired because she refused to work on Saturday, her
sabbath. "'23 She was unable to find other employment that allowed
her to observe her sabbath.' 24 The state denied her unemployment
compensation claim on the ground that she refused available work
opportunities without "good cause."' 25 In analyzing the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the Court balanced the burden imposed on
the claimant's free exercise of religion126 against the state's interest
in disallowing an exemption.'2 v The Court reasoned that imposing
a choice between abandoning a religious precept or foregoing unem-
ployment compensation benefits was an unconstitutional burden on
the claimant's religious freedom.2 " The Court held that the state
had no compelling interest justifying the heavy burden. 129  More
suiting from this type of conflict will be referred to as "exemption cases," because the plain-
tiffs requested exemption from laws of general application.
118. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (legislation allowing children to be
released from school for religious instruction); Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Kern
Bakery, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (legislation requiring "reasonable accom-
modation" of religious beliefs by employers designed to prevent religious discrimination),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983). See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text; L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-5, at 823-25.
119. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-4, -5, at 819-25.
120. See generally Caldor v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983).
121. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
122. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
123. Id. at 399.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 400-01.
126. Id. at 403-06.
127. Id. at 406-09. This is the balancing test applied in exemption cases. See also Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (where government regulation violates free exercise, the state's in-
terest must be "of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.").
128. Id. at 404.
129. Id. at 409.
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significantly, the Court held that requiring South Carolina to ex-
empt Sabbatarians from the unemployment benefit statutory re-
quirements did not violate the establishment clause. 130
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,13' another exemption case, Wisconsin
law required children to attend school through the age of sixteen. 132
Amish citizens refused to send their children to any school beyond
the eighth grade,133 and requested an exemption from this state re-
quirement, claiming that high school attendance "was contrary to
the Amish religion and way of life." 134 After reviewing the Amish
religion and culture135 and the state's interests, 36 the Court con-
cluded that requiring the Amish children to attend school beyond
the eighth grade burdened their free exercise rights. 137 Further-
more, Wisconsin's interest in educating citizens was not great
enough to override those rights.138 As these cases indicate, free ex-
ercise rights will prevail 39  unless an overriding state interest
exists."40
B. Legislation Protecting the Free Exercise of Religion or
Preventing Religious Discrimination
Legislation designed to remove burdens placed on religious free-
dom illustrates the second kind of conflict between the religion
130. Id. The Court characterized its decision as a fulfillment of the government's duty to
remain neutral in the face of religious differences. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981) (exemption from unemployment benefit requirements for religious belief other
than Sabbath).
131. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
132. Id. at 207.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 209.
135. Id. at 215-19.
136. Id. at 213-34. See id. at 213-14 for discussion of state's power to regulate education.
The state further asserted that compulsory education was necessary for preparing children for
participating in our political system and for being "self-reliant and self-sufficient" citizens.
Id. at 221.
137. Id. at 219. The Court stated that Wisconsin's compulsory education requirement
"would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." Id.
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id. at 221. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-7, at 833-34 (suggesting that the
dominance of the free exercise clause in cases of conflict "is the natural result of tolerating
religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance
of establishment."). See also Giannella, supra note 112, at 1389 (whether to accommodate
"requires a value judgment as to which [religion clause] is to become dominant when there is
a conflict-the one premised on a vital civil right, or the one premised on an outmoded
eighteenth century political theory.").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that federal govern-
ment's interest in administering its social security program was great enough to override the
Amish employer's free exercise claim).
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clauses and must be distinguished from the exemption cases.
Rather than incidentally burdening free exercise rights,14 ' a likely
intent of the drafters of section 53-303e was to protect religious
practitioners by removing certain burdens in the workplace. Since
such legislation does not burden free exercise rights, the free exer-
cise balancing test 42 would not apply.
This legislation raises a fundamentally different establishment
clause concern than was present in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 43 Lemon,
first of all, did not present a conflict between the two religion
clauses since no free exercise rights were affected.' 44 Furthermore,
Lemon involved financial support to religious institutions, which is
one of the major concerns of the establishment clause. 4 ' Were the
Lemon test to be applied literally to legislation designed to remove
burdens from religious freedom, the purpose requirement146 would
be violated without exception, and were the effect requirement 47
interpreted to mean that any privilege conferred because of religious
beliefs was unconstitutional, no statutory religious accommodation
would be permissible.
Since in these situations the free exercise test is inapplicable, and
the Lemon test has major weaknesses, a different standard is neces-
sary to determine the constitutionality of legislation consisting of
competing free exercise and establishment concerns. This Case
Note explores two approaches for testing the validity of legislation
designed to protect religious freedom or to prevent religious dis-
crimination and applies these approaches to section 53-303e.
The applicability of either approach depends in part upon the
Connecticut legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. Section
53-303e could be considered an attempt to accommodate employ-
ees' free exercise rights,141 or could be classified as antidiscrimina-
tion legislation.' 49 If the Connecticut legislature intended section
53-303e to protect religious freedom by forcing employers to ac-
commodate employees' religious beliefs, then it must be determined
whether the statute is a permissible accommodation of free exercise
141. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
143. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
144. Id. The legislation in Lemon was a salary supplement for nonpublic school teachers.
Id.
145. Id. at 612. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
148. See infra text accompanying note 152.
149. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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rights.15° Alternatively, if the legislature designed section 53-303e
to prevent or minimize religious discrimination, its validity should
be tested by the same standards used to test the constitutionality of
other antidiscrimination legislation. 5 '
1. Permissible Accommodation
The legislative purpose of section 53-303e is not expressly
stated. However, a possible intent of the Connecticut legislature
was for employees to have the freedom to worship on their sabbath
without losing their employment. Arguably, the legislature accom-
modated the free exercise of religion by preventing a worker's
choosing between earning a living or exercising religious beliefs. 152
Section 53-303e could then be classified as an accommodation stat-
ute. The next inquiry would therefore focus on whether the estab-
lishment clause forbids this type of accommodation.15 3
The Court has held that there is no violation of the establish-
ment clause when the free exercise clause compels accommodation.
This is illustrated by the mandatory exemption cases, Yoder154 and
Sherbert,15 5 where the Court reasoned that enforcing certain legisla-
tion placed an impermissible burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion.156 Exempting groups or individuals from requirements for
religious reasons raised concerns about state advancement of reli-
gion. 157 However, since these exemptions were compelled by the
free exercise clause, they did not at the same time violate the estab-
lishment clause. To hold otherwise would create an irreconcilable
conflict between the religion clauses. Thus, the exemption cases
suggest that the free exercise clause predominates when there is a
conflict.158
150. See infra notes 153-82 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 189-214 and accompanying text.
152. See, eg., Sherbert, 373 U.S. 398 (1968) (Court held this choice placed an unconstitu-
tional burden on the free exercise of religion). See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text;
infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
153. Forbidden accommodation occurs when religious practices are accommodated by
statute in a way that violates the establishment clause. See, eg., McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released-time program for public school children struck down
under establishment clause because public school building was used, providing direct aid to
religion). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-4, -5, at 819-25.
154. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
155. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
156. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. See also Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)
("[Tihe Religion Clauses. . .specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of reli-
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A legislature might codify types of religious accommodation
which it believes are compelled. Professor Tribe posits that when
the two religion clauses are in conflict, legislation that is "arguably
compelled" '159 should be upheld under the establishment clause as
being within a "zone of permissible accommodation" of free exer-
cise rights.160 Tribe's "arguably compelled" test is best explained
through his illustrations.
Walz v. Tax Commission 6 ' is one example of arguably com-
pelled legislation. In Walz, the Court upheld a statute exempting
religious property from certain tax provisions.16z Justice Brennan,
in his concurring opinion, reasoned that not only did this legislation
violate the concept of entanglement for establishment clause pur-
poses,' 63 but the absence of an exemption might have violated the
free exercise clause by creating excessive state involvement."6
Since possible free exercise implications arguably compelled this
legislation, it should be permissible under the establishment clause.
Zorach v. Clauson, 65 which upheld a statute permitting the re-
lease of public school students for religious instruction, is another
illustration of arguably compelled legislative accommodation. Pro-
fessor Tribe reasons that if individual children requested to be re-
leased from school to participate in various religious activities, the
school would arguably have to allow the children to leave; the fail-
ure to do so would unconstitutionally impinge on the children's free
exercise rights. 66 Because of these free exercise implications, the
legislation was arguably compelled, and was therefore a permissible
accommodation of religious freedom. 67
gious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit,
prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government.").
159. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4, at 822. The term "arguably" was chosen by Profes-
sor Tribe to illustrate the ambiguity resulting from the overlap of the two religion clauses. Id.
at 823.
160. Id. at 822-23. This theory relies on the existence of mandatory accommodation and
the impossibility of complete separation of church and state. Id. at 822.
161. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-5, at 824 n.5.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 691-92.
164. Id. at 692 n.12.
165. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
166. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-5, at 823-35. See also Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313
(Court's reasoning is very similar). Zorach is distinguishable from McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), because in Zorach religious instruction did not take place on the
school premises. Cf Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (the state's failure to exempt religious
practitioner from unemployment benefit requirements impermissibly burdened her free exer-
cise rights).
167. 'See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-5, at 824.
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Section 53-303e prevents an employer from discharging employ-
ees who refuse to work on their sabbath.168 In analyzing whether
this statute is arguably compelled, and therefore a permissible ac-
commodation, Sherbert v. Verner 169 is instructive.
Under Sherbert, if Thornton had been discharged from his job at
Caldor prior to the enactment of section 53-303e, he could not have
been denied state unemployment benefits.170 Sherbert involved an
employee whose sabbath observance conflicted with available work
hours. The Court held that
[being forced] to choose between following precepts of [one's]
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of [one's] religion to accept work on the other
hand. . . [imposes] the same kind of burden upon the free exer-
cise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for
[one's] worship.1 71
Were section 53-303e simply a codification of the Sherbert hold-
ing, it would be a permissible accommodation under the arguably
compelled analysis. In prior cases, the Court has held that the free
exercise clause mandates certain exemptions. However, section 53-
303e does not codify Sherbert, but instead modifies the holding in
that case by requiring the employer to not discharge the sabbath
observer. 172 This, in essence, places the economic burden on the
employer to accommodate the sabbath observer's free exercise
rights. Consequently, the state does not have to pay unemployment
benefits.
The opponents of section 53-303e argue that economically bur-
dening the employer changes an arguably compelled statute into an
impermissible accommodation of first amendment free exercise
rights.17 3 However, two rationales support section 53-303e as a per-
missible accommodation statute. First, the burden on the employer
is simply a change in an already existing burden, not a shift in the
burden from the state to the employer. 174 Second, the shifting or
changing of an economic burden to the private sector poses a sub-
stantive due process question, not a first amendment question, and
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(b) (1976).
169. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
170. The Board found that Thornton had been discharged within the meaning of the
statute. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788. Thornton was therefore fired because of
his religious observance.
171. 374 U.S. at 404.
172. See supra note 26 for text of statute.
173. See 53 U.S.L.W. 3182, 3183 (Sept. 18, 1984).
174. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
1984]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
is subject only to rational basis review.175
Under the first rationale, it is essential to recognize that employ-
ers always carry an economic burden in Sherbert-type situations.
When discharged sabbath observers collect unemployment benefits,
their former employers must indirectly support them. Private em-
ployers must contribute to the unemployment benefit programs, and
because their contributions are based on the costs they impose on
the system, they must pay more when they discharge an em-
ployee.1 76 Thus, under this rationale, the employer simply assumes
a different burden: not firing a sabbath observer who refuses to
work on a particular day versus subsidizing the unemployment ben-
efits program. 
17 7
The second rationale for upholding section 53-303e as a permis-
sible accommodation of religion derives from the historical fact that
states have placed economic costs on private businesses for a variety
of different reasons. An individual's attempt to strike down eco-
nomically burdensome legislation has always been analyzed under
the due process clause.1 78 Economic or substantive due process
claims are only subjected to rational basis review.179 To satisfy the
rational basis test, a statute need only be rationally related to a legit-
imate state interest. 8 Section 53-303e meets this test because the
statute is rationally designed to meet the legitimate state goal of
protecting its citizens' free exercise rights.'18 Thus, under Professor
Tribe's "arguably compelled" test, the statute in Caldor should be
upheld, despite the establishment clause attack, as a permissible ac-
commodation of the free exercise of religion.' 82
175. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
176. A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 92.61 (1984). See also
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (Court upheld statute requiring
employers to pay employees for time off to vote). Section 53-303e cannot be said to place a
more onerous burden on the employer than in Day-Brite, and both cases involve the exercise
of fundamental constitutional rights.
177. Section 53-303e does not force employers to pay sabbath observers for their days off.
178. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Court applied due
process clause to statute forbidding opticians from fitting lenses without a prescription); Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (statute banning milk sales in cer-
tain containers upheld under due process clause).
179. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
180. Id. at 488.
181. See supra text accompanying note 152.
182. This would be consistent with Justice Marshall's dissent in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 91 (1977): "Thus, I think it is beyond dispute that [Title VII]
does-and consistently with the First Amendment, can-require employers to grant privi-
leges to religious observers as part of the accommodation process." The Court did not decide
the constitutionality of Title VII in Hardison.
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2. Preventing Religious Discrimination
An alternative method of testing the validity of section 53-303e
is to analyze it under the standards used for testing the constitution-
ality of antidiscrimination legislation. Although the Connecticut
court in Caldor did not consider the possibility,183 section 53-303e
may have been intended to minimize religious discrimination in the
workplace.' 84 Subsection (b) 18 5 not only states that sabbath observ-
ers may refuse to work on their sabbath, but it also protects them
from being discharged for exercising that freedom.186 Subsection
(d)187 provides that employers cannot inquire about sabbath obser-
vance as a condition of employment. These provisions suggest that
the Connecticut legislature detected a bias against religious practi-
tioners in the job market, and sought to remove it.' 88 Considered in
this framework, section 53-303e should be analyzed no differently
than other statutes designed to remove or minimize discriminatory
effects.1 89
In affirmative action legislation protecting blacks, race is a nec-
essary consideration; to attack discrimination, one must consciously
address the race issue. 9 ' Similarly, religion must be an important
consideration when a legislature seeks to prohibit religious discrimi-
nation. This explains, in part, why the Lemon test is an inappropri-
ate standard for affirmative action legislation-such statutes aim to
eliminate religious discrimination. 19
Justice Brennan advanced an appropriate two-part test for mea-
suring the validity of antidiscrimination legislation in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.'92 Under his test, there first must
183. See generally Caldor, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785.
184. See infra note 188.
185. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(c) (1976).
186. Section 53-303e(c) empowers the Board of Mediation and Arbitration to grant relief,
including reinstatement and back pay, to employees discharged for this reason. Id.
187. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(d) (1976).
188. The potential for bias is apparent from the Caldor case itself. The Board held that
Thornton had been discharged because of his insistence on observing his sabbath. Caldor,
191 Conn. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788. Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the
claimant had lost her job because she refused to work on her sabbath. Congress has also
sought to minimize the effects of religious discrimination in the workplace. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
189. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
190. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
191. See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text.
192. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The test was also advanced by Justice Marshall in his concur-
ring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (the proper standard is
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
be an important governmental purpose. t9 3 Second, the legislation
must be closely related to meeting that purpose.194 Under this sec-
ond part of the test, "any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes
any group or that singles out those least well represented in the
political process to bear the brunt of a benign program." 195
Remedying effects of past discrimination' 96 and providing equal
economic opportunity t97 are important governmental objectives in
race discrimination cases. They should be equally important in the
area of religious discrimination. Protecting first amendment rights
is no less important than protecting fourteenth amendment equal
protection rights. The courts must defer to a legislative determina-
tion that there is a need to eliminate discrimination. 198 The means
chosen by the Connecticut legislature were related to and will sub-
stantially aid in the achievement of the legislative purpose. By
preventing employers from conditioning employment on sabbath
observance, t99 and by preventing discharge of employees because
they observe a sabbath,2" section 53-303e is designed to further the
remedial legislative purpose of eliminating biases in the workplace
that result in religious discrimination.
The remaining concern under Justice Brennan's Bakke test is
whether the means chosen cause stigmatization or result in placing
a burden on those without political power.20 1 Stigmatization is not
a problem with section 53-303e. Bakke was concerned with
problems akin to segregation and the labeling of individuals or
groups as inferior.2"2 Neither is present in this case.
Further, there is no suggestion that section 53-303e burdens em-
ployees who lack political power, or who are members of discrete
and insular minorities.20 3 In Bakke, Justice Brennan emphasized
whether laws "designed to further remedial purposes serve important governmental objec-
tives and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
193. 438 U.S. at 359.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 361.
196. See, e.g., id. (affirmative action program to raise percentage of blacks in medical
school held to have an important governmental objective); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(legislation requiring 10% of contracts to go to minority businesses for local public work
projects to receive federal funds was upheld).
197. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
198. Id. at 463, 472-73, 483-84.
199. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(d) (1976).
200. Id. § 53-303e(b).
201. See supra text accompanying note 10; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79
(1980).
202. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 374-75.
203. Id. See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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• that one major concern with remedial legislation should be whether
the legislation discriminates against those it intends to benefit." ° In
Caldor, all religions, including minority religions, are provided the
same protections."z 5 Section 53-303e gives all sabbath observers the
same job possibilities as individuals who do not observe a sabbath,
and does not discriminate among religions. The concern, therefore,
is whether this legislation unconstitutionally burdens those who do
not observe a sabbath.
Under section 53-303e, sabbath observers may effectively choose
their day off. Those who have no sabbath may not designate their
day not to work, even though they may have strong nonreligious
reasons for doing so.206 However, the freedom to choose a day off
for nonreligious reasons is not constitutionally protected. There-
fore, deprivation of that choice, versus deprivation of religious free-
dom, is not a constitutionally recognizable burden. 07 Though the
constitution guarantees free exercise of religion, it does not provide
for free exercise of every kind of personal choice.20 8
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,2 0 9 another affirmative action case, the
Court stated that "[w]hen effectuating a limited and properly tai-
lored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a
sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible., 210
The statute's opponents argued that the legislation in Fullilove
204. 438 U.S. at 375.
205. See Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794 (stating that § 53-303e "does not
favor one religion over another").
206. This theory was advanced in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977). The Court stated that "to allow Hardison and others like him to get days off neces-
sary for strict observance of their religion could only be done at the expense of others who
had strong, but perhaps nonreligious reasons for not working on weekends." Id. at 81. Har-
dison, however, was decided by statutory interpretation and not by constitutional analysis.
See also Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981). In that case, the court permitted a Seventh-Day Adventist to donate money to a
charity in lieu of union dues. In discussing the distinction between primary and incidental
benefits, the court said:
A religious accommodation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely be-
cause it can be construed in some abstract way as placing an inappreciable but
inevitable burden on those not accommodated. Exemption of conscientious objec-
tors from military conscription has been upheld despite the effect of requiring no-
nobjectors to serve in their stead.
Id. at 1246.
207. The argument that religious reasons for not working are constitutionally no different
than nonreligious reasons for not working was specifically rejected by the majority of the
Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
208. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 852 n.37 ("[Tihere is, after all, no 'free choice
of babysitter' clause.").
209. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
210. Id. at 484, citing Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976).
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caused them economic harm and gave an economic benefit to mi-
nority-owned businesses.2 ' The Court, however, held that in light
of past discrimination, this benefit was acceptable.21 2 Preferential
treatment is not automatically unconstitutional if there has been
past discrimination and future discrimination is likely.21 3 In Cal-
dor, sabbath observers do not receive an economic benefit nor do
others suffer any economic detriment.21 4 In light of potential reli-
gious discrimination, existing first amendment protections, and the
overall goal of equal employment opportunities, one's choosing a
day off to observe religious beliefs is a small price for others to pay
for religious freedom. This is not the kind of burden that violates
Justice Brennan's Bakke test.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the United States Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to provide guidance for resolving
conflicts between the first amendment religion clauses. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court, by woodenly applying the current estab-
lishment clause test and ignoring the free exercise rights involved,
wrongly found section 53-303e unconstitutional. This statute could
be upheld under the Lemon test; however, section 53-303e could
also be held valid by characterizing it either as a permissible accom-
modation of religious freedom or as antidiscrimination legislation.
GAIL WESTHAFER
KATHRYN M. HARTRICK
211. The legislation required awarding of 10% of public work projects to minority busi-
nesses as a condition precedent to receiving federal funds. Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 454. Some of
the opponents of the statute were nonminority contractors and subcontractors. Id. at 455.
212. Id. at 484-85.
213. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring).
214. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
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Courts analyzing horizontal and vertical agreements between business entities
once had a clear path to decision. If the agreement was of a certain kind, such as
price-fixing, it was per se illegal and nojustification could overcome that characteri-
zation. If the agreement was of another kind, such as information-sharing among
members of a trade association, it was legal unless found to be unreasonable
The authors argue that the previous clear division between the per se rule and the
rule of reason has been blurred by recent Supreme Court decisions, and that many
traditionally illegal restraints are now being subjected to the rule of reason analysis.
The purpose of the Article is to provide guidance for those seeking to understand what
factors will be taken into account by courts applying the developing rule of reason
standard.
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICALLY, TWO standards have been applied to antitrust
violations. The per se rule condemned certain activities auto-
matically. Price-fixing, for example, was subjected to the per se
rule. This standard traditionally has not allowed the defendant to
justify the alleged violation; once a plaintiff establishes the violation,
he will triumph. The rule of reason standard was reserved for in-
stances in which the activity might be beneficial, such as certain
agreements among members of a trade association. Under this stan-
dard, evidence of market conditions, justifications for the activity,
* Dean and Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. B.A., University of Minnesota (1956); LL.B., University of Minnesota School
of Law (1962).
** Student and an editor of the Law Review, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. A.B., Kenyon College (1980); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(1985).
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and actual or potential effects on competition could be considered.
In recent years, the distinction between these two standards has be-
come blurred. The courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court,
are analyzing traditional per se antitrust violations under the less
strict rule of reason standard, or conducting a rule of reason type of
analysis to determine whether the per se test should be applied.
This trend makes it increasingly important to understand the rule of
reason test.
The Supreme Court's initial opinions applying the rule of reason
to alleged antitrust violations indicate that the economic effects of
the activities are crucial to the analysis. However, the Court has
failed to provide guidance on the specific factors to be considered.
The rule of reason has not been authoritatively reviewed since the
Supreme Court held in Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 1
that nonprice vertical restraints were to be judged under the rule of
reason. Lower courts have struggled with the language of Sylvania
and its emphasis on the "pernicious effects" and the "redeeming
virtues" of an activity. These courts have examined market shares,
the effect on competition, and possible justifications for the re-
straints. It is to these opinions that one must turn to begin to un-
derstand the rule of reason standard. The lower court opinions,
however, are not always clear and provide only a basis for continual
development of the new standards. The Supreme Court and many
lower courts often appear to be embracing a modern approach to
antitrust economics, which provides an opportunity to clarify and
rationalize this rule of reason.
I. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PER
SE RULE AND THE RULE OF REASON
Courts apply two standards to analyze collusive practices under
antitrust statutes.2 Horizontal price-fixing3 and horizontal territo-
rial allocations4 are prototypical practices to which an automatic
prohibition-the per se rule-is applied. Each involves an agree-
ment among direct competitors where the effect on competition, in
the form of reduced output and increased prices, creates an unjusti-
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982)).
3. See, eg., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing
among oil producers).




fled welfare loss. The per se rule makes these practices illegal with-
out further consideration of their purpose, justification, or effect on
the market. Vertical price-fixing, an agreement between suppliers
and their customers to keep resale prices at a fixed level, also is
subject to the per se rule, although the economic justifications for
automatically prohibiting such arrangements are not well-
grounded.5
The per se rule applies as well to exclusionary practices by indi-
vidual firms which monopolize 6 or attempt to create monopolies.7
The per se rule also is applied to joint actions such as vertical tie-in
agreements where appreciable market power exists8 and to some
group boycotts.9 The concern over these practices is that those
seeking or sustaining a dominant position will limit entry or will
make it unprofitable for others to compete by undercutting prices.
As a result, these dominant firms will attain a larger share of the
market and be able to set prices and production at noncompetitive
levels. The justification for applying the per se rule to these exclu-
sionary practices is the potential welfare loss, in the form of higher
prices and reduced output, that monopolistic practices can impose
on society.
Many horizontal agreements are encouraged or, at least, not
evaluated so unfavorably. Horizontal arrangements such as a trade
association's publication of market statistics from its members 0 or
a cooperative program of institutional advertising by all or some
firms in an industry are not subject to the per se rule. Courts
apply the more lenient rule of reason standard to such arrange-
ments. 2 In applying this test, courts consider a number of factors:
justifications for the practice, potential harm from the arrangement,
market power of the participants, and the effect on competition.
5. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach. Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per se
ConcepL" Price-Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
6. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 33-39 (1977).
7. Id. §§ 49-52.
8. Id. §§ 150-156. See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1561-68
(1984) (discussion of the legality of tie-in arrangements).
9. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at §§ 83-90. But see Vogel v. American Soc'y Apprais-
ers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (boycotts are per se illegal only if used to enforce a
practice that is itself illegal).
10. See, ag., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (infor-
mation-sharing among manufacturers).
11. See S. OPPENHEIMER, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
102 (4th ed. 1981).
12. But see Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 319.
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The courts generally allow the arrangement if potential benefits to
competition outweigh immediate or potential harm.
A. Consumer Welfare Approach
The previous bright line between per se illegality and rule of
reason legality has begun to break down in recent years as the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have developed a more so-
phisticated understanding of antitrust economics. The reasons for
this breakdown are numerous. First, it is thought to be economi-
cally beneficial to encourage all firms-even those with market
power-to expand output and to sell their goods and services at
competitive prices. Therefore, courts generally adopt the rule of
reason approach if the challenged action can be characterized as
ancillary to "legitimate business practices."13
Another factor is that courts have come to recognize important
distinctions between horizontal and vertical collusion. In the past,
courts sometimes borrowed antitrust concepts developed for hori-
zontal arrangements-involving direct competitors-and applied
them to vertical practices-involving suppliers and their custom-
ers-without considering inherent analytical differences and basic
economic distinctions. For example, the per se rule of Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 4 is applied to prohibit all
resale price maintenance even though vertical price-fixing has long
been shown to serve ends very different from horizontal price-fix-
ing.15 However, when the challenged practice appears to be clearly
desirable, courts sometimes employ artful distinctions to avoid au-
tomatic prohibitions. Finally, there is increasing recognition that
the most appropriate goal for the antitrust laws is to promote "con-
sumer welfare" by fostering economic efficiency rather than by pro-
tecting smaller firms from the pressures of competition. This
recognition reflects growing economic sophistication on the part of
13. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.),
modified and aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 26-30, 263-79 (1978). See also NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (although a certain amount of cooperation is needed to
maintain competition in college athletics, an agreement restricting television rights inhibited
competition and, therefore, failed a rule of reason analysis); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
441 U.S. 1 (1979) (agreement among composers to sell their compositions for a fixed price
passes rule of reason analysis because restraint is necessary to encourage production).
14. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
15. See, e.g., Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960); Bork, supra note 5; cf Brief of the Department of Justice, as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982),
affd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
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the judiciary, as well as greater political acceptance of the need to
foster economic growth. A number of recent cases illustrate the
trend away from application of the per se rule.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,16 the Supreme Court re-
manded, for a rule of reason analysis, an agreement among a group
of composers to issue a blanket license to CBS to perform the com-
posers' songs at set fees. The Court concluded that a pricing ar-
rangement which is essential to a legitimate purpose is not within
the per se rule otherwise applied to horizontal price-fixing unless it
is " 'plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming vir-
tue.' ,,17 The Court said the arrangement was essential to the pro-
duction of the compositions and, therefore, served a legitimate
purpose in the marketplace. Further, the Court specified that in
deciding whether to apply the per se or rule of reason standard, the
lower court should analyze whether the practices "facially. . .tend
to restrict competition and decrease output ... or instead are
designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive.' "I'
The 1983 Supreme Court Term produced three cases which fur-
ther exemplify the Court's tendency to avoid rigid application of the
per se rule. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,19 the Court refused to apply the per se rule to allega-
tions that the NCAA had fixed prices for telecasts of college foot-
ball games and that the exclusive network contracts were
tantamount to a group boycott of all other broadcasters.'0 The
Court stated that although the use of exclusive contracts to limit the
number of televised games constituted horizontal price-fixing and
limits on output, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule
to "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.""1 Nonetheless, the
Court, after a rule of reason analysis, concluded that the arrange-
ments were an unreasonable restraint on competition. 2
In Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, 3 the Court in effect ap-
plied a rule of reason analysis to a tying arrangement involving an
16. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 19-20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
n.16 (1978)).
19. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
20. Id. at 2960.
21. Id. at 2961.
22. Id. at 2962-67.
23. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
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exclusive hospital contract with a firm of anesthesiologists. 4 The
Court stated that tying arrangements have been condemned only
"when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'market
power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do
in a competitive market."25 This statement limits the per se rule to
a narrow field. The Court found that the hospital's thirty percent
market share was not enough market power to prevent a patient
from entering a competing hospital and using the services of other
anesthesiologists.26 Applying a rule of reason analysis, the Court
found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the arrange-
ment unreasonably restrained competition.27
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.2 further illustrates the
Court's unwillingness to apply a per se rule rigidly. Spray-Rite, a
cut-rate distributor of herbicides, claimed that Monsanto, directly
and through customer and territorial restraints, conspired to fix the
resale price of its herbicides.29 The district court instructed the jury
that if it found that the nonprice restrictions were part of an unlaw-
ful scheme to fix prices, Monsanto's actions were subject to the per
se rule against price-fixing.3" Its ruling was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.31 More importantly, the appellate court held that "proof of
termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support
an inference of concerted action."32 The implications of such a low
standard for inferring collusion are obvious. A manufacturer who
independently terminates a dealer for failure to comply with legiti-
mate vertical restraints and who also has received price complaints
about that dealer will find it almost impossible to refute the infer-
ence of concerted action. The result will be application of the per se
rule and probable treble damages. In light of this standard, it was
not surprising that the court upheld the jury finding for Spray-Rite.
The Supreme Court rejected the minimal standard of proof re-
quired by the Seventh Circuit to establish a conspiracy.33 The
Court emphasized the basic distinction between independent and
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1559.
26. Id. at 1566.
27. Id. at 1567-68.
28. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
29. Id. at 1467.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1468.
32. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), affid
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
33. 104 S. Ct. at 1468. There had been a longstanding conflict between the circuits as to
the proper standard of proof for establishing the existence of concerted action. See id. at n.5.
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concerted action and reminded lower courts that a manufacturer
has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever he wishes as
long as that right is exercised independently.3" The Court noted
that as a natural course of doing business, manufacturers and dis-
tributors are in constant communication about prices and market-
ing strategies." This is especially true when a manufacturer
implements nonprice restrictions as a marketing strategy. Distribu-
tors who comply with such costly programs will necessarily voice
complaints to manufacturers about cut-rate distributors who benefit
from their efforts.36 The Court concluded that there must be evi-
dence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by
the manufacturer and distributor.37 That is, there must be "direct
or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the
manufacturer and others had a conscious commitment to a com-
mon scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective"38 before the
per se rule will apply.
The Court appeared to require substantial proof, although it
found on the basis of ambiguous evidence39 that Monsanto and its
distributors were parties to a conspiracy to fix prices. Nonetheless,
the Court's decision illustrates its general willingness to embrace an
economic approach based on whether a particular business practice
is efficient rather than to adhere blindly to past practices of protect-
ing small businesses regardless of the harm to consumer welfare.
The "consumer welfare" approach used by the Supreme Court
in Broadcast Music, NCAA, Hyde, and Monsanto is not novel. In
Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,' the Court expressly
ruled that nonprice vertical restraints, in particular territorial and
customer marketing restrictions imposed on distributors, should be
evaluated under the rule of reason.41 In reaching that conclusion,
34. Id. at 1469.
35. Id. at 1470.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1471.
38. Id.
39. The Court cited two pieces of evidence in support of its decision against Monsanto.
First was testimony that in the months following Spray-Rite's termination other price-cutters
were advised that if they did not maintain prices they would be terminated. Id. Second, a
newsletter, dated four weeks before Spray-Rite's termination, discussed Monsanto's incentive
and shipping programs and stated that "every effort will be made to maintain a minimum
market price level." Id. This evidence of an alleged agreement to fix prices was linked to
Spray-Rite's termination through testimony from Spray-Rite's president that a Monsanto of-
ficial mentioned price complaints in a meeting following Spray-Rite's termination. Id. at
1472.
40. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
41. Id. at 49-59.
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the Court suggested several justifications for nonprice vertical re-
straints such as expanded product distribution, increased dealer in-
vestment, and improved customer service as well as the elimination
of "free-riders." 42 The Court also emphasized that an important
consideration should be the effect of the restriction on economic
efficiency and interbrand competition.43
These cases suggest that an examination of market conditions
and economic effects is necessary to determine whether the per se
rule applies in horizontal cases or whether the rule of reason stan-
dard has been satisfied in vertical cases. However, the Supreme
Court's message has been far from clear. Although Broadcast Mu-
sic, NCAA, Hyde, and Monsanto illustrate a gradual acceptance of a
"consumer welfare" approach to antitrust, the Court's most recent
opinions also reflect its reluctance to depart completely from past
precedent protecting smaller businesses regardless of efficiency con-
siderations.' In fact, the Court ignored the primary thrust of its
decision in Broadcast Music when it applied the per se rule in Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.4"
B. Remnants of the "Civil Rights" Approach
In Maricopa, the Court was faced with a system for delivering
health care services based upon the establishment of maximum fees.
The Court disregarded the significant cost savings to consumers and
mechanically applied a per se rule. The majority's conclusory anal-
ysis simply announced that "the anticompetitive potential inherent
in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered."46 In an unsatisfactory at-
tempt to distinguish Broadcast Music, the majority termed the ar-
rangement in Maricopa "fundamentally different."'47 A sharp
dissent pointed out that it is "well settled that this [per se] charac-
terization is not to be applied as a talisman to every arrangement
that involves a literal fixing of prices.""
Even the post-Maricopa opinions in Hyde, NCAA, and Mon-
santo reflect the Court's reluctance to embrace fully a careful eco-
42. Id. at 54-55.
43. Id.
44. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Na-
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
45. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id. at 356.
48. Id. at 361-62.
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nomic approach to antitrust analysis.49 The decision in NCAA may
cause the most difficulty. The Court did consider various economic
factors in its refusal to apply the per se rule to the "naked"5 hori-
zontal restrictions imposed by the NCAA on the televising of foot-
ball games. Nonetheless, major portions of the Court's language
are troublesome. For example, the Court stated that "the absence
of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on
price or output."5 This statement illustrates that the Court is not
appropriately considering the basic economic fact that without mar-
ket power there can be no adverse impact on prices and output.
Hyde and Monsanto also illustrate the Court's failure to provide
a clear economic analysis of the challenged restraint. Although the
Court in Hyde in effect applied a rule of reason analysis to a tying
arrangement, it did not formally abandon application of the per se
rule to all such arrangements. Instead of reexamining the economic
validity of applying the per se rule to tying arrangements in gen-
eral-which four members of the Court favored-the Court limited
the application of the rule to a narrow field.52 Monsanto presented
another opportunity for the Court to review, in modem economic
terms, the validity of per se illegality of vertical price restraints.
The Court refused to reexamine its decision in Dr. Miles although
the same arguments that persuaded the Court in Sylvania to apply a
rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints support the abandon-
ment of the per se rule in resale price maintenance cases.53 The
Court did make it more difficult for a plaintiff in a dealer termina-
tion case to invoke the per se rule.5 4 However, because of the obvi-
ous weakness and self-serving nature of the evidence, 5 it is unclear
whether Monsanto's stated higher standard of proof will, in fact,
provide much protection for manufacturers faced with allegations
of a conspiracy to fix prices.56 The Court's strained effort to find
49. See Sims and Myers, Baxter Grabs Brass Ring in 1984 Antitrust Season, Legal
Times, July 23, 1984, at 10, col. I for an early and thoughtful discussion of the 1984 Supreme
Court antitrust decisions. The authors compare the "civil rights" approach of the Warren
Court with the movement toward a more modem economic approach of the current Court.
50. 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
51. Id.
52. 104 S. Ct. at 1570.
53. See supra note 5.
54. 104 S. Ct. at 1473.
55. See supra note 39.
56. Whether the lower courts will follow what the Supreme Court "said" in Monsanto
rather than what it "did" remains to be seen. See, eg., Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life
Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the Supreme Court's emphasis on distinguishing
concerted and unilateral action, the court found both direct and circumstantial evidence that
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evidence of concerted action and, therefore, find for the small busi-
nessman, Spray-Rite, as well as its refusal to address the validity of
its 1911 decision equating vertical and horizontal price-fixing, is il-
lustrative of its reluctance to part with the past.
The Supreme Court has clearly moved toward acceptance of a
"consumer welfare" approach to antitrust but its inability to break
with the past has led to much confusion over the proper approach
for determining whether the per se rule is to be applied. Broadcast
Music, Hyde, NCAA, and Monsanto illustrate the economic consid-
erations on which the Court is beginning to focus before applying
the per se rule. This economic analysis is much like the analysis
courts apply to nonprice vertical restraints under a rule of reason.
The development of the rule of reason standard has been more
abrupt and sometimes more coherent in nonprice vertical restraint
cases. The explicitness of Sylvania and its widespread acceptance in
the antitrust community has meant that direct challenges to non-
price vertical arrangements are generally treated as rule of reason
cases. Sylvania forces an examination of the economic effects and
justifications for nonprice vertical restraints. Although considera-
ble lower court confusion still exists over the meaning of the rule of
reason standard applied in Sylvania, these lower court decisions
provide the only guidance on the meaning of the rule of reason.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SYLVANIA RULE
A brief review of the law regarding restrictions on the distribu-
tion of goods and services is necessary to understand the rule of
reason standard. The standard as applied to vertical restraints grew
out of a three-quarter-century dispute concerning the right of a
manufacturer to control the distribution and price of his products
and services.
A. Doctrinal Gyrations: From Dr. Miles to Sylvania
The earliest and leading case applying antitrust standards to
vertical restraints was a tort action against a drug manufacturer for
restricting the resale price of his products through contracts with
wholesalers. In Dr. Miles,57 the Supreme Court, relying on com-
a life insurance agency was terminated pursuant to a group boycott between the insurance
carrier and others); St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan Yacht, Inc., No. 82-2704
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 4, 1984) (termination of a dealership after a rival dealer requested
such termination to eliminate resale price competition was not per se illegal).
57. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
[Vol. 35:155
RULE OF REASON
mon law rules prohibiting restraints on the alienation of property,
held that a manufacturer who sells his product to a wholesaler is
not entitled to restrict its subsequent resale by a retailer. Although
not labeled as such, the ruling that resale price maintenance (RPM)
is injurious to the public interest and void58 was in effect a holding
that vertical price restraints were per se illegal. Dr. Miles was a
vertical price-fixing case, but the Court's theory and doctrine were
not necessarily limited to price agreements.
For many years the central issue was whether a manufacturer
could avoid the rule in Dr. Miles by refusing to sell to retailers who
failed to comply with his suggested price or by consigning rather
than selling the product to a distributor. In 1919, the Supreme
Court created the Colgate exception to the per se rule of Dr. Miles
by permitting a manufacturer to recommend prices unilaterally and
cut off retailers who failed to comply. In United States v. Colgate,59
the Court observed that a manufacturer is necessarily entitled to set
the price at which his product is sold and to determine with whom
he will deal. This exception proved to be of limited use because a
manufacturer's only option to enforce the resale price was to drop
the best known price-cutter with no warning and hope that the ac-
tion served as an example to other price-cutters. Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, especially United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co.,60 further reduced the usefulness of Colgate by holding that any
method of securing compliance with a suggested retail price consti-
tuted an "agreement" for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.6
1
The Court, in United States v. General Electric Co.,62 approved a
resale price maintenance arrangement in which a dealer was a con-
signee of the manufacturer and, therefore, acted as his agent. The
Supreme Court cast doubt on this exception when it invalidated a
virtually identical "consignment" arrangement in Simpson v. Union
Oil Co. 63 The limitations of Parke, Davis and Simpson made it diffi-
cult for a manufacturer to control the retail price of his product
unless he established his own distribution system and did not deal
with others.
58. Id. at 404.
59. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
60. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
61. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 347, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
62. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
63. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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The 1975 repeal64 of the Miller-Tydings Act further restricted a
manufacturer's ability to impose vertical price restraints. In the
1930's, individual states began to pass "fair trade" laws which spe-
cifically authorized manufacturers to set the resale prices of their
products. Congress approved the Miller-Tydings Act65 in 1937 to
validate resale price maintenance arrangements which involved in-
terstate commerce and which were permitted under the antitrust
laws of a particular state. Judicial limitations on Colgate and Gen-
eral Electric and the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act essentially
foreclosed the opportunity for vertical price restrictions. Manufac-
turers then focused their attention on nonprice restraints such as
territorial and customer limitations. Until the 1940's, the govern-
ment did not challenge these arrangements and, in fact, such re-
straints were approved in several private actions.66
In 1944, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co. ,67 held vertical territorial and customer restrictions to
be per se illegal if they were an integral part of an agreement to fix
prices. Four years later, the Department of Justice, relying on
Bausch & Lomb, announced that it would treat vertical territorial
and customer restraints unaccompanied by price-fixing on the same
basis. For many years this position went unchallenged. Consent
agreements negotiated by the Department enforced the view that all
vertical restraints, whether price or nonprice, were automatically
illegal.68
When the Supreme Court heard its first nonprice vertical re-
straint case, however, it reversed a lower court's holding that terri-
torial and customer restrictions were illegal per se. In White Motor
Co. v. United States,6 9 the Court concluded that it did not "know
enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these ar-
64. Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
65. District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (repealed
1975).
66. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 7 n.14 (1977) for a listing of these private actions
which include: Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291
F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
67. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
68. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 66, at 7-8 n.17 (1977) for a listing of
these consent decrees which include: United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,739 (N.D. Tex. 1963); United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Shaw-Walker Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,491 (W.D.N.Y. 1962).
69. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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rangements emerge"7 to be certain whether they stifle or invigorate
competition. Therefore, it remanded the case for a trial on the mer-
its.7" In light of the three dissenters' argument for a per se rule, the
opinion was widely interpreted as applying a rule of reason ap-
proach to nonprice vertical restraints.72 In fact, the Court merely
ruled "that the legality of territorial and customer limitations
should be determined only after a trial."7 3 The case was settled on
remand and, therefore, the Court did not have an opportunity to
determine whether the per se rule or rule of reason applied to non-
price vertical restraints.
Nevertheless, it seemed that the rule of reason was the appropri-
ate standard as two appeals courts almost immediately overturned
more stringent Federal Trade Commission decisions.74 Neither
court, nor for that matter, the Supreme Court in White Motor,
heeded the argument that nonprice dealer restrictions violated
property law rights of resale. Thus, it came as a surprise when the
Supreme Court returned to the rationale of Dr. Miles and held in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," that "[o]nce the manufac-
turer has parted with title and risk. . . his effort thereafter to re-
strict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred
. . . is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."7 6
The sweeping nature of the Schwinn rule was immediately and
harshly criticized.77 Lower courts applied the decision narrowly
and developed numerous exceptions.7" Partly in response to
Schwinn, a new economic view of vertical restrictions became
70. Id. at 263.
71. Id. at 264.
72. This interpretation, which is erroneous, is still repeated. See, eg., Halverson, An
Overview of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger Guidelines,
52 ANTrrRusT L.J. 49, 55 (1983).
73. 372 U.S. at 264.
74. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (dealer restrictions were
reasonable business practices); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963)
(territorial restrictions are permissible vertical restraints under a rule of reason standard).
75. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
76. Id. at 382.
77. See, eg., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 295-97 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243,
270-72 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth AnnualAntitrust Review, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1680-
86 (1967).
78. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 66, at 13-14 nn.34 & 38 for a listing
which includes: Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1378-
82 (Ct. CI. 1971).
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widely accepted. That view was that vertical restrictions serve
many useful ends: more efficient distribution, protection against
free-riders, and lower costs. 79 Commentators advancing this eco-
nomic approach also demonstrated that the adverse effects of verti-
cal restraints are more theoretical than real, and in fact are
implausible given our economic structure.
The process of evaluation and change was not gradual. Shortly
after the tenth anniversary of the Schwinn decision, the next territo-
rial restriction case reached the Supreme Court, and the law
changed abruptly. In Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., °
the Court expressly overturned Schwinn and announced that a rule
of reason test should be applied to nonprice restrictions imposed by
manufacturers on their dealers. The Court recognized that distribu-
tion restrictions could achieve efficiencies by promoting retailer and
distributor investments in promotional activities and quality
controls.8 '
B. The Sylvania Opinion
In overruling the per se rule of Schwinn, Justice Powell quoted
at length from Justice Brandeis' elliptical statement of the rule of
reason in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,82 but provided
no further elaboration.
The Brandeis formulation of the rule of reason provides that:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be deter-
mined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, re-
strains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To deter-
mine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its con-
dition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
79. See generally Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1975); R. BORK, supra note 13; Posner, supra note 5; Bork, supra note 5.
80. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
81. Id. at 55.




The elements noted by Justice Brandeis-circumstances pecu-
liar to the business, conditions before and after the restraint, the
nature and purpose of the restraint-are necessary to the rule of
reason analysis. But as such disparate commentators as Dean Rob-
ert Pitofsky8 4 and Judge Richard Posner85 have noted, the mere list-
ig of areas for inquiry provides virtually no guidance on the
meaning of the rule or how it should be applied.
In Sylvania the Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical re-
strictions should not be automatically condemned. The Court
noted that such restrictions could be used by manufacturers to pen-
etrate new markets, to protect full-priced dealers from free-riders
who otherwise would destroy any incentives for dealer investment
in promotion and services, and to assure product quality and cus-
tomer safety. 6 The Court acknowledged that, depending on the
scope of the restrictions, competition among dealers of the same
product (intrabrand competition) would be stifled.87 This, however,
could be outweighed by benefits to competition among manufactur-
ers (interbrand competition).8"
The Court in Sylvania stated that some nonprice vertical re-
straints could still be per se illegal, 9 but failed to provide any gui-
dance as to which ones. In a footnote, it reiterated that resale price
agreements remained void under the rule of Dr. Miles.9 0
Thus, the opinion in Sylvania provided little guidance for ana-
lyzing a manufacturer's nonprice vertical restrictions. It is not
clear, for example, whether the market power of the manufacturer
is important. Nor did the Court indicate whether intrabrand costs
are simply to be weighed against interbrand benefits, with the re-
straint upheld unless the costs outweigh the benefits. Is it important
that the likely adverse effects of any restriction on interbrand com-
petition are minimal or nonexistent even though intrabrand compe-
tition is eliminated? Is a manufacturer to be punished with treble
damages and attorneys' fees if purported efficiencies are, in fact, not
83. Id. at 238.
84. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1978).
85. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. Cili. L. REv. 6, 14-15 (1981).
86. 433 U.S. at 55.
87. Id. at 54.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 58.
90. Id. at 51 n.18.
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realized, and the market has already exacted a toll for this mistake?
The Court also failed to acknowledge that applying the rule of rea-
son has generally meant that the defendant is exonerated.91
Lower courts have faced a steady diet of cases raising the ques-
tion of the appropriate standard of proof in a nonprice vertical re-
striction case under a rule of reason.
III. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON IN THE COURTS
9 2
In Sylvania Justice Powell suggested two criteria for determin-
ing whether the rule of reason standard is met. The initial consider-
ation is whether the arrangement is likely to have a "pernicious
effect" on interbrand competition.9 The second consideration is
whether the restraint has "redeeming virtues."9 4 These related con-
cepts have become departure points for a rule of reason analysis.
A. The "Pernicious Effect" Requirement
Vertical restraints that do not directly affect price were sub-
jected to the rule of reason analysis by the Supreme Court in Sylva-
nia because they may promote rivalry among competitors
(interbrand competition). 95 Sylvania adopted a distribution scheme
in the early 1960's to control dealer territories through location
clauses.96 These restrictions were imposed when Sylvania had one
or two percent of the U.S. market.97 At that time, the market
leader (RCA) had a sixty to seventy percent share of the television
set market.9" Even attributing all of Sylvania's subsequent success
to its location clauses, Sylvania still had but five percent of the mar-
ket when sued several years later by a dealer.9 9 Given the numer-
91. This was, at least, the result until 1977. See Posner, supra note 5, at 14. But see
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (an agreement
limiting television rights restrained price and output and restricted competition and, there-
fore, failed a rule of reason analysis); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (rule of reason held insufficient to exonerate defendant under a defense
based upon the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable within engineering
profession).
92. This section of the Article borrows heavily from the two excellent discussions of
nonprice restrictions: Rill, Non-Price Vertical Restraints Since Sylvania: Market Conditions
and Dual Distribution, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 95 (1983); W. LIEBLER, ANTrrRUST ADVISER
§§ 2.20-.21 (2d ed. 1983 Cum. Supp.). Our analysis, however, differs somewhat from theirs.
93. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 51-52.
96. Id. at 38.
97. Id.
98. Id. at n.1.
99. Id. at 38-40.
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ous alternatives available to retail consumers, Sylvania did not have
the market power to affect the retail price of television sets. In eco-
nomic terms, Sylvania's restriction on intrabrand competition could
have no adverse effect on interbrand competition or consumer
welfare.
The Court's opinion in Sylvania clearly indicates that a mere
showing of an intrabrand impact is not enough to find a pernicious
effect on competition. An adverse intrabrand impact is a necessary
result of every successful vertical restraint. Unless the restraint
reduces competition among producers of competing products (in-
terbrand effects), the restraint cannot adversely affect competition.
Therefore, the "pernicious effect" on competition can be demon-
strated only by evidence that the vertical restriction has an adverse
interbrand effect, that is, it reduces output and raises the price of
the product significantly above the competitive level in the industry
as a whole.
The burden of proving that a manufacturer's restrictions on in-
trabrand competition have had a "pernicious effect" on interbrand
competition will most often lie with the plaintiff in a vertical re-
straint case. In Daniels v. All Steel Equipment, Inc.," the Fifth
Circuit required the plaintiff, an office furniture dealer whose deal-
ership was involuntarily terminated, to prove that his termination
adversely affected interbrand competition. 101 The court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the plain-
tiff failed to present any evidence of an anticompetitive effect involv-
ing more than the manufacturer's product.1 0 2
The Second Circuit, in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,1"3 used
an analysis similar to that of the Fifth Circuit in Daniels and re-
quired that the plaintiff present evidence of an adverse effect on in-
terbrand competition. The plaintiff, a distributor of Whirlpool
vacuum cleaners, alleged that his dealership was terminated in an
100. 590 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Carlson Machine Tools, Inc. v. American
Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to establish coer-
cive enforcement of suggested prices); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564
(5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's evidence held insufficient to support its claim that the brewer's
activities had any anticompetitive effect), cer denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). But see
Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) (per se rule applicable if
behavior is determined to have such a pernicious effect on competition that it is conclusively
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade).
101. 590 F.2d at 113.
102. Id. at 113-14.
103. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See also Borger v. Yamaha
Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane) (the legality of an agreement depended
upon the effect of a restraint on interbrand competition).
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effort by Whirlpool and another distributor to end all price compe-
tition in Whirlpool vacuum cleaner sales. 1" Finding for the de-
fendant, the court noted that something more than an agreement
between Whirlpool and the other distributor must be proven.10 5
The court required that the plaintiff show "that from this course of
conduct there was an anticompetitive effect on the vacuum cleaner
industry as a whole."10 6 Relying on Colgate, the court stated that it
is a manufacturer's prerogative to decide with whom he will deal
and that a mere refusal to deal should not be a basis for antitrust
liability. 107
In determining whether a nonprice vertical restraint actually
has a "pernicious effect" on competition, several courts have fo-
cused on the likely interbrand effect of the restriction by examining
whether the manufacturer, in fact, had any power over the market.
Two questions are often addressed to determine a defendant's mar-
ket power: (1) whether the defendant has a substantial share of the
market and (2) whether the defendant competes with other manu-
facturers of the same product.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit concluded in Val-
ley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd. 0o that a plaintiff must
initially demonstrate that the defendant had significant market
power as evidenced by a significant share of the market.109 In up-
holding the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, the court relied on the plaintiff's failure to show
that the defendant had significant market power." 0 Without such
market power it was presumed that the defendant had no ability to
raise prices significantly above the competitive level without losing
business to competing sellers.111 Only after significant market share
is proven should a court address whether the restraint has sufficient
redeeming virtues to satisfy the rule of reason. 1 2 That is, without
market power the nonprice restraint can have no adverse effect on
104. 579 F.2d at 128.
105. Id. at 133. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
106. 579 F.2d at 133.
107. Id.
108. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717
F.2d 1560 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must establish defendant's market power); Davis-Wat-
kins Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982) (upheld a jury instruction
requiring the consideration of market power when applying a rule of reason test), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 1718 (1983).
109. 678 F.2d at 745.
110. lid.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins, 686 F.2d at 1202.
[Vol. 35:155
RULE OF REASON
interbrand competition. Therefore, it is presumed to be lawful. The
Fifth and the Ninth Circuits also follow this approach.
113
What constitutes a significant market share and, therefore, suffi-
cient market power to affect interbrand competition adversely has
not been answered authoritatively. Three recent decisions from the
Ninth Circuit are illustrative. First, in JBL Enterprises, Inc. v.
Jhirmack, "' the court held that a market share of between two and
four percent was "too small for any restraint on intrabrand compe-
tition to have a substantially adverse effect on interbrand competi-
tion."1 ' This seems to suggest that a substantial share of the
market, perhaps one-third to one-half, might satisfy a plaintiff's
burden. However, in Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc.," 6 the court
ruled that the plaintiff must supply independent evidence of dimin-
ishing interbrand competition even though the seller had between
seventy and eighty percent of the market in windmills. 117 This need
for additional evidence also was apparent in the circuit court's ap-
proval of summary judgment for Sylvania after the case was re-
manded to it."' In Sylvania, the court pointed to the existence of
other "viable television manufacturers available to sell to any retail-
ers who wished to enter the Sacramento market, and [evidence that]
their products were interchangeable with Sylvania's." 1 9
Some courts have suggested in dicta that a vertical restraint
might fail without supporting evidence of interbrand competition in
the market. One possible consequence of the desire for such evi-
dence is that the burden of presenting it may be placed upon the
defendant. In Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co.,12 the Fifth
Circuit seemed to limit its requirement that the plaintiff show an
adverse effect on interbrand competition to those situations where
113. See, eg., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
114. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,199 at 71,828 (9th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. See also Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984)
(less than 5% of the market share insufficient to establish market power); Ron Tonkin Gran
Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's share of
foreign car market was between 2.48 and 5.2%); Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Manage-
ment Co., 553 F.2d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's sales of mutual funds comprised
only 2 to 3% of total sales in the relevant market). But see Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983) (70 to 75% market share sufficient to establish
significant market power).
116. 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
117. Id. at 756.
118. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,962, at 72,967 (9th Cir. 1982).
119. Id.
120. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); see also H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (healthy interbrand competition established by evidence).
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"[s]tiff interbrand competition in the relevant market shielded the
consumer from an anticompetitive effect of [the manufacturer's] at-
tempts to reduce the rivalry between dealers." 121 The concern in
Muenster Butane and allied decisions seems to be that the costs to
consumers of diminishing intrabrand competition might outweigh
any benefits from interbrand competition if there is no interbrand
competition in the market. One panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals explicitly adopted this balancing approach in ruling for a
terminated dealer in Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America. 2 2 This ju-
dicial cost-benefit approach to vertical restraints seems contrary to
the Supreme Court's statement in Sylvania that interbrand competi-
tion is the primary concern of antitrust law. 123 And as the only
appellate case where the plaintiff-dealer has prevailed, Eiberger may
be an aberration.1 2 4
Although the absence of interbrand impact probably should be
the controlling factor in upholding a vertical restraint, a majority of
tribunals also look to other market conditions. Perhaps the leading
advocate of this view is former FTC Commissioner David Clanton
who, in Beltone Electronic Corp.,'"5 relied on a number of market
conditions to justify the territorial restrictions. Beltone's mere six-
teen percent market share2 6 alone did not enable it to require its
dealers to work only within assigned geographical areas and to deal
exclusively in Beltone hearing aids.127 Looking beyond Beltone's
market share, Commissioner Clanton relied on the rise of new dis-
tributional methods, the entry and growth of new competitors, and
the resulting change in the market position of the leading firms. 128
This analysis is similar to the approach adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit in American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 129
In American Motor Inns, the plaintiff (AMI), the largest fran-
chisee of Holiday Inns (HI), sued HI following HI's denial of
121. 651 F.2d at 298.
122. 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d
422 (5th Cir. 1981); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
124. See text accompanying infra notes 151-55.




129. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d
Cir.) (motive stemming from protection of public from harm is sufficient lawful purpose to




AMI's application to open a new franchise. 130 Under its standard
licensing agreement, HI also refused to allow AMI to build any
other type of hotel in the disputed areas.131 The Third Circuit va-
cated that part of the district court's judgment which held that the
"non-Holiday Inn" clause failed a rule of reason analysis. 132 The
court noted that the district court failed to consider not only the
relevant market share but also such other factors as "the total com-
petition extant in the industry," "the effect of the challenged restric-
tion on the market structure," and "the number and size of firms in
the industry."
13 3
In sum, the case law reflects uncertainty about the impact of
vertical restraints on interbrand competition. The primary dispute
is whether a modest market share alone insulates a nonprice vertical
restraint from attack or whether "other factors" must be weighed in
determining its legality. Secondary, but still unanswered, issues in-
clude: what constitutes a substantial market share, whether a sig-
nificant market share alone triggers a finding of actual or likely
adverse effect or merely requires the defendant to come forward
with anecdotal or economic evidence of no adverse market effect,
and what other evidence is necessary to justify a restraint despite
insubstantial market shares.
B. The Redeeming Virtues of the Restraint
While most judicial attention has focused on the manufacturer's
market power, the courts and the FTC also have reviewed the justi-
fications for the restraint, at least where market power was more
than de minimis or was not insignificant.
In a typical rule of reason case, the business rationale for the
restraint is the focal point of the defendant's case. For example, in
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,'34 the plaintiff
alleged that Liquid Carbonic Corp. and three of its distributors con-
spired to maintain territorial and customer restrictions on the sale
of Liquid's products.135 Red Diamond claimed that its distributor-
ship was terminated because it transgressed these restrictions. 136
The Fifth Circuit considered not only the "pernicious effect" on in-
130. 521 F.2d at 1235.
131. Id. at 1248.
132. Id. at 1247.
133. Id.
134. 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 1002.
136. Id.
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terbrand competition, which it found to be nonexistent, but also the
"redeeming virtues" of the restraints.137 In particular, the court
found that the restrictions enabled the manufacturer to serve its
customers more effectively, thereby actually intensifying interbrand
competition. 138
In Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co.,139 the plaintiff beer whole-
saler brought suit against a manufacturer for refusal to deal. The
plaintiff had refused to honor territorial limitations and, as a result,
was terminated by the manufacturer. The court found that the re-
striction was "essential to the efficient functioning of [Coors'] qual-
ity control procedure,"" 4 which was designed to avoid the adverse
effects of age, light, and heat on the quality of the beer. Other cases
have noted the manufacturer's desire to have dealers maintain ade-
quate storage and inventories as legitimate business reasons for a
restraint. 141
In another dealer termination case, Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp.,142 the court analyzed a territorial limitation
placed by a tire manufacturer on its dealers. The court discussed
the numerous marketing efficiencies which might be achieved
through the imposition of vertical restraints. 143 With regard to the
defendant's particular justifications for the territorial restrictions,
the court felt that the manufacturer's concern that unauthorized
dealers would neither advertise nor be able to perform necessary
repair services justified the territorial restraint.1" The court found
evidence that the plaintiff, in fact, was free-riding on the promo-
tional efforts and services provided by authorized dealers 14 and,
therefore, concluded that the manufacturer's decision to terminate
the plaintiff's dealership for refusal to comply with the restriction
was not unreasonable. 146
This notion of free-riders is prominent in the economic litera-
ture justifying manufacturer imposition of vertical restraints and
was a persuasive influence on the Supreme Court's decision in Syl-
137. Id. at 1005-06.
138. Id. at 1006.
139. 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982).
140. Id. at 576.
141. See Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
142. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
143. Id. at 756.
144. Id. at 757, 758-59.
145. Id. at 757-58.
146. Id. at 762.
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vania.147 The FTC's opinion in Beltone148 also examined the eco-
nomic implications of free-riders. Without its territorial
restrictions, Beltone's "advance-contact system," whereby dealers
identified and tested potential hearing aid users, could easily be un-
dercut by dealers from outside the territory.149 Effective advertising
programs also might have been hindered, according to the Commis-
sion.15 It is not clear from the opinion whether these justifications
were necessary to the respondent's exoneration or merely an addi-
tional, alternative holding.
Only one appellate post-Sylvania decision has found a vertical
price restraint unjustified.15 In the somewhat bizarre Eiberger
case, one dealer sought to "enforce" a manufacturer's territorial
program by going on a rampage and ripping open boxes in another
dealer's store looking for evidence of extraterritorial sales.1 5 2 In
iberger, the warranty service assessment imposed by Sony on all
authorized dealers might have been difficult to explain because it
applied whether or not warranty services were in fact performed. 53
In any case, a panel of the Second Circuit concluded that the manu-
facturer's objectives could have been achieved by a less restrictive
requirement such as paying the dealer for actual warranty serv-
ices. 54 The importance of this decision seems to have been under-
cut by another panel which did not adhere to the less restrictive
alternative approach in upholding a territorial clause. 155
As this review suggests, the number of cases evaluating the "re-
deeming virtues" of a restraint is still relatively few. Like Justice
Powell, they do little more than list the justifications or announce
why a particular restraint could be reasonable. Neither the analysis
nor empirical data seem particularly impressive.
147. 433 U.S. at 55.
148. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,934 (1982).
149. Id. 22,385. That is, competing discounters could rely on Beltone's activities in-
forming consumers of their hearing loss to sell these customers hearing aids. Without incur-
ring these advance-contact costs, the free-riding competitors would have a substantial cost
advantage.
150. Id. 22,383.
151. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 1073-74.
153. Id. at 1077-78.
154. Id.
155. Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980).
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IV. RATIONALIZING THE "RULE OF REASON"
A. Vertical Restraint Cases
The rule of reason standard is increasingly important as courts
apply it not only to vertical restraints but also to arrangements
which traditionally have been per se illegal. Therefore, it is impor-
tant that the standard be developed in a manner which provides
guidance to both the courts and the business community. Unfortu-
nately, the standard has not been adequately developed in the verti-
cal restraint cases. Most vertical restraint cases at the appellate
level present contract rather than antitrust questions. Whether a
manufacturer's termination of a dealer because of inadequate dealer
performance or a change in distribution patterns was authorized or
contemplated by the parties at the time of contract formation is a
question for contract law.56 However, habits developed under the
Schwinn rule, and antitrust remedies providing for treble damages
and attorneys' fees, encourage disappointed dealers to pursue anti-
trust remedies as well. The result after Sylvania is that these plain-
tiffs usually lose.
It is clear from these cases that counsel for plaintiffs have not
fully understood the meaning of Sylvania, at least as interpreted by
most commentators and lower courts. This confusion is not sur-
prising given the ambiguous and incomplete development of the
economic factors to be considered under the rule of reason standard
as set forth in Sylvania. The difficulty is that the Court has only
partially accepted the economic theory of then-Professors Bork'5 7
and Posner.' 5 8 This theory illustrates that vertical restrictions are
generally harmless because they do not create market power or re-
strict output and are likely to be adopted to achieve the manufac-
turer's and dealer's marketing goals.
The Court's failure to embrace fully the legality of vertical re-
straints probably lies in the difficulty of forging a six-person major-
ity to overturn Schwinn. To do so, Justice Powell apparently had to
distinguish Dr. Miles and leave the per se rule undisturbed.I5 9 As a
156. See, e.g., Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancel-
lations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A
Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. Rav. 91 (1981).
157. See Bork, supra note 5.
158. See Posner, supra note 77.
159. Cf. Justice William Rehnquist's speech of Sept. 15, 1984, quoting former Chief Jus-
tice Hughes, quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, § 1, at 27.
If our opinions seem on occasion to be internally inconsistent, to contain a logical
fallacy, or to insufficiently distinguish a prior case, I commend you to the view
attributed to Chief Justice Hughes upon his retirement from our Court in 1941. He
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result, the Court did not focus exclusively on the economic effects
(i.e., output restrictions) of the arrangement on interbrand competi-
tion alone-although it acknowledged that interbrand effects were
the primary concern."6 Instead, it confused the issue by discussing
the intrabrand impact of the restraint and by condemning all direct
price-fixing. As Professor Wesley J. Liebler points out, all vertical
restraints, price or nonprice, have similar price effects and cannot be
distinguished on economic or other analytical grounds. 61
Where does this leave the practicing attorney forced to represent
his client and the law before a court? Where does it leave a lower
court? One route, of course, is to invite the Supreme Court to re-
think elements of its Sylvania decision and to correct current ana-
lytical and doctrinal limitations. This is not an appealing
suggestion for most practitioners whose clients are not anxious for
their disputes to become test cases. Nor does it really help the con-
scientious judge bound by precedent.
On the other hand, the inherent inconsistencies in Sylvania and
the divergent case authority provide creative counsel and judges
with an opportunity to rationalize not only the law of vertical re-
straints but also the law governing arrangements which tradition-
ally have been per se illegal and now are being subjected to a rule of
reason analysis. If the bench and bar are to seize this opportunity,
they must understand why certain restraints are being tested by a
rule of reason. The theory underlying the Court's analysis of verti-
cal restraints in Sylvania is simply that vertical restraints generally
are adopted to achieve marketing goals such as dealer servicing and
advertising. Vertical constraints are designed by manufacturers to
gain an edge on their competitors. They are unlikely to have an
interbrand effect unless they are part of a dealer or manufacturer
cartel. Both economic and legal analysis, as numerous commenta-
tors have explained, demonstrate that the use of vertical restraints
to achieve either kind of cartel is highly unlikely.162
Proof under the rule of reason standard should concentrate on
evidence indicating that the vertical restraint is an integral part of
an agreement among manufacturers or dealers to fix prices among
said that he always tried to write his opinions logically and clearly, but if a Justice
whose vote was necessary to make a majority insisted that particular language be
put in, in it went, and let the law reviews figure out what it meant.
Id.
160. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
161. Liebler, 1983 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: The Distinction Between
Price and Nonprice Distribution Restrictions, 31 UCLA L. REv. 384 (1983).
162. See Posner, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 77.
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competing firms at one level or another. Evidence of an agreement
between a manufacturer and dealer, despite the Monsanto decision,
will not support such a finding since it generally is not in the inter-
est of one to foster a cartel by the other.
Although the Court's decision in Monsanto failed to set forth an
adequate standard for proving the existence of a "conspiracy," it is
clear that "something more" is required than mere evidence that a
dealer's termination was preceded by price complaints. It also
should not be enough to show that the terminated dealer charged
lower prices or was a maverick since nonprice vertical restraints are
likely to be designed to assure uniformity in distribution and to
achieve improved product and service quality. Evidence that verti-
cal restrictions support a horizontal cartel should be viewed skepti-
cally since the cartelization of a market is exceedingly difficult
without some sort of government assistance through, for example,
blocking patents or sealed bid procedures. Finally, the current fo-
cus on market share seems analytically unsound even though it is
not likely to result in error. Its effect is to focus time and attention
on less significant evidence of market power rather than on direct
evidence of reduced output or higher prices.
B. Per Se Violations
It is clear from the opinions in Broadcast Music, Hyde, Mon-
santo, and NCAA that there also are valid economic justifications
for arrangements which traditionally have been considered per se
illegal. The Court is critically analyzing these arrangements in
modern economic terms. Before subjecting a defendant to the per
se rule, the Court has analyzed some horizontal restraints in a man-
ner similar to the rule of reason approach followed in vertical re-
straint cases. In Broadcast Music, 6 the Court examined a
horizontal agreement to fix prices, typically a per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, in terms of its competitive effects and
redeeming virtues. The Court applied a similar rule of reason anal-
ysis in Hyde' to uphold a tying arrangement, although it left the
general per se approach to tying theoretically intact. In Hyde the
Court also considered the market power of the parties to the agree-
ment and the effect of the restraint on competition in the market.
In NCAA, 165 the Court conducted a rule of reason analysis before
163. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
164. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
165. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
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rejecting the college athletic association's justifications for an agree-
ment limiting the number of college football games on television.
It is especially important to develop the meaning of the rule of
reason analysis in light of the Court's movement away from a rigid
application of the per se rule. This analysis typically entails a dis-
cussion of the "pernicious effects" on competition and the "redeem-
ing virtues" of the restraint. Anticompetitive effects most often are
analyzed in terms of the defendant's market share and, in some
courts, other evidence of market conditions. The concentration on
market share is misplaced.166 The focus of the analysis should be
on the likely effects of the restraint. If industry output is not af-
fected, it is irrelevant what effect the arrangement has on a particu-
lar manufacturer's output. Of course, manufacturers are likely to
seek increased output and improved market positions. Claims to
the contrary should bear a heavy burden. Otherwise, application of
the antitrust laws will reduce rivalry and, as a consequence, harm
consumer welfare.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's most recent antitrust decisions illustrate a
breakdown of the previous guidelines on when to apply the per se
rule or the rule of reason standard. Whether a restraint will be sub-
jected to a per se rule or whether it passes a rule of reason test is to
be determined by very similar economic considerations. The stan-
dard under the rule of reason, as set forth by Justice Powell in Syl-
vania and in subsequent Supreme Court cases, provides little
guidance on the meaning of the rule. The Court is gradually em-
bracing a "consumer welfare" approach to antitrust analysis and
deviations in this movement, such as the approach in Maricopa,167
seem unlikely to flourish. The current situation presents an oppor-
166. Since vertical restrictions generally cannot alter market power significantly, it is also
inappropriate to rely on market concentration analysis in applying the rule of reason standard
to vertical restraints. As a filter for prosecutorial discretion, as applied by the Department of
Justice's Vertical Restraints Guidelines and, separately, by Professor Easterbrook, they may
be an inexpensive device for approving obviously harmless restrictions. See Vertical Restraint
Guidelines, [Spec. Supp.] ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Jan. 24, 1985);
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. RE. 1 (1984). The danger is that this test
will be applied affirmatively to challenge vertical restraints even though competition is intense
and the restraints enhance consumer welfare. The history of the use of concentration meas-
ures to find horizontal mergers presumptively illegal justifies this concern, particularly in the
absence of theoretical and empirical support. Cf Gellhorn, Government Merger Policy and
Practice - 1983, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 419 (1983).
167. Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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tunity to rationalize the rule of reason and shape the future of anti-
trust analysis in terms of modem economic considerations.
